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Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the author of things,
everything degenerates in the hands of man. He forces one soil to
nourish the products of another, one tree to bear the fruits of an-
other. He mixes and confuses the climates, the elements, the seasons.
He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave. He turns everything up-
side down, he disfigures everything, he loves deformities, monsters.
He wants nothing as nature made it, not even man himself. For
him man must be trained like a saddle-horse; he must be shaped
according to the fashion, like trees in his garden.
¡p align=”right”¿Jean-Jacques Rousseau: E´mile1
It is instructive to take a walk around a Primary school. Start with the cloak-
room, where each child has a hook for her coat, with her name by the hook
and, perhaps if she is small, a picture — here a cow, there a penguin. In the
classroom, where of course the teacher knows all the children by name, there
is colour and light. The children wear bright clothes in what are appropriately
called primary colours. They have placed their hands on tissue paper of vari-
ous hues, drawn around them, written their names on them, cut them out and
pasted them onto the windows. This is their classroom, the display declares.
The light that enters the room (contrast the stained-glass of the cathedral, de-
picting Biblical scenes) is thus mediated by the children themselves: this is
child-centeredness indeed. Examples of children’s work are also displayed on
the walls: good work, work that shows signs of effort, perhaps a piece of work
from every child to show that what each does is valued. Despite the demands
of the literacy hour and the numeracy hour and whatever other hours have
become mandatory, there is a nature table where the children can touch and
smell conkers, acorns, leaves, turnips. Perhaps there is even a gerbil in a cage,
the responsibility of a pair of children each week. While it patrols its wheel
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the children take part in circle-time, sitting on the carpet and listening to each
other respectfully as Ina, Paul, and Winston describe their week-end or talk
about how they feel about walking to school among the traffic.
It is instructive to take a tour around a secondary school. Do not look for the
cloakroom, for it became a place of anarchy and is now used to store furniture.
Hence the children heave heavy bags around with them all day, filled with
books, sports equipment, and mobile phones. These bags make it difficult to
negotiate the stairs and narrow corridors and are a source of friction as pupils
move between lessons, for, of course, they no longer have their own classroom
as in the primary school. Instead they go from the English teacher’s room to
the math teacher’s or to nobody’s room in particular, just A47. There are
few pictures and no work displayed, not least because such things only attract
graffiti. I once walked every inch of corridor in a comprehensive school and saw
only one interruption to the grey expanse of walls: a notice that said, “Please
keep this school tidy.” Where children’s bodies were an object of care in their
earlier schooling, now they seem to be denied. The uniform (perhaps grey, like
the walls) is not designed to show it off to advantage. So many children for the
RE teacher, the music teacher, and the rest to cope with, that they never learn
their names — and some children seem to manage it so that there is hardly a
teacher who does know their name.
It is well known that something goes dreadfully wrong between primary and
secondary schooling. Those lively, engaged children turn, within months, into
surly adolescents whose greatest fear is that they will be thought uncool and
become ostracized, that another pupil will scrawl “boffin” on their exercise-book.
This change of attitude is a mystery, and the object of much research.
On to the university, where the students have neither bodies nor names. An
exaggeration, of course: but we are only concerned with our students’ intellec-
tual development here, and no-one could be expected to know the names of the
200 young people taking Psychology of Recognition; students report that the
postgraduate uncomfortably in charge of the seminar never told them his name,
seldom tries to learn theirs, and if he does he forgets them by the next sem-
inar three weeks later. One department has replaced first-year tutorials with
an on-line learning package. Anonymization of examination scripts and course
assignments has naturally led to more anonymity. The History department
recently gave up allocating each student a personal tutor: the logic of modu-
larization was against it, they said, not to mention the demands of research;
and anyway, wasn’t that what the Counselling Service was for? The idea of
displaying students’ work is absurd, the idea of any kind of exhibition of posters
or pictures around the Economics department or in the lecture theatres hardly
less so.
It is familiar that two (at least: but I shall be schematic) educational traditions
have come down to us. One can be thought of as the Rousseau-Crusoe tradition.
The child is an active learner, for whom the teacher does best, as E´mile’s does
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in the book named after him, to put him in the way of learning experiences.
The more these are vivid, embodied, and above all real, the better he (there is
indeed something gendered about this: the child is, like Robinson Crusoe, in
“the age of primitive man”) will learn. The philosophy is often distilled into
such saws as “I am told and I forget; I do and I remember” (remarkably, such
stuff re-emerges in the literature of management education as if it were quite
unproblematic). It is a Romantic philosophy, and if the sketch of the primary
school above has a Romantic flavour, it is not wholly of my own making. Of
course, the Romantic tradition in education has been anathematized in the last
twenty years.
The other tradition has recognizable roots in Plato. In our learning odyssey we
move from loving boys to the more cerebral love of vases and sculpture. If we
travel far enough we come to love Beauty itself, the eternal and abstract Form.
What we took, in our benighted existence in the cave, for real things were in
any case only shadows. When, freed from our bonds, we recognize their unre-
ality and pass out of the cave, we become aware of the sovereign and supreme
good, the guarantor of all other Forms, whose image is the Sun. There are no
Forms of mud or hair, Plato tells us; nor, doubtless, of conkers, leaves, or acorns.
Of course there is another Plato, who wrote the marvellous early and early-ish
dialogues (Theaetetus, Phaedrus) in which embodied persons, prone to eros,
love, drink, war, and disease, have their prejudices challenged and their ideas
changed, are thrown into aporia, are offered inspiring and thought-provoking
visions. “Theaetetus” is not just a convenient name for a character in a piece
of philosophy put into dialogue form to make its timeless, abstract truths more
palatable to the reader. Plato’s dialogues, though, became the victims of aca-
demic philosophy which then contrived to ignore the powerful element in those
dialogues of engagement between the Socratic teacher and the taught as some-
one with a fleshed-out and contextualized life. Thus those elements in this
tradition that could have challenged its emphasis on the abstract, the remote-
from-experience, were emasculated. Of course, there are powerful influences
from the ascetic end of the Judaeo-Christian religious tradition, too many and
too complex to go into here, which have joined forces with this Platonic strain.
I turn now to the connection between these remarks on education and the idea
of sustainable development. That phrase is understood in many ways. At its
heart, I take it, is the perception that humankind’s attitude to the natural
world is essentially one of plunder: of taking with no thought for the morrow.
Sometimes there is a faith that nature will be endlessly bountiful, miraculously
repairing herself for further depredations: that “nature is never spent / There
lives the dearest freshness deep down things,” as Gerard Manley Hopkins put
it. Sometimes there is no particular thought at all behind our treatment of the
planet, or no thought uncoloured by selfishness. This kind of behaviour cannot
continue: it cannot be sustained. It is entirely short-term and profligate. We
need instead attitudes to the natural world and to natural resources (revealingly
so called: Heidegger’s Bestand) that allow us to live in harmony with them into
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the foreseeable future. That would be sustainable development. And we are
trying to discover what frames of mind need to be developed to make those
attitudes possible. My suggestion in this paper is that, to a considerable extent,
the ways of thinking that are doing the damage are those characteristic of, or
even central to, formal education in our time. Of course they do not come only
from there: if they were not more widely prevalent they could not have infected
what passes for educational thinking. Nevertheless it is in such thinking that
they are found at perhaps their most virulent.
Most obvious, first, is the instrumentalism, the techno-rationalism that runs
through education at all levels. Everywhere the talk is of effectiveness and
what works: effective use of language, as if all language aspired to the status
of promotional literature for double-glazing, effective university teaching, as if
the outcomes of a particular course of study were wholly known in advance, the
only question being to reach them as economically as possible. In Jean-Franc¸ois
Lyotard’s often-quoted words, “In matters of social justice and of scientific truth
alike, the legitimation of Aˆ power is based on its optimizing the system’s per-
formance — efficiency.”2 Performativity is the dominant value: the maximizing
of outputs (examination passes, throughput of students) and the minimizing of
inputs (staff time, and of course staff — or human resources — themselves).
We have become lulled into thinking of effectiveness and its siblings as neutral,
commonsensical values. But as MacIntyre wrote:
The whole concept of effectiveness is Aˆ inseparable from a mode
of human existence in which the contrivance of means is in central
part the manipulation of human beings into compliant patterns of
behaviour Aˆ3
MacIntyre equates this with managerialism and notions of social control oper-
ating downwards from above. It is an attitude that is disrespectful of persons
as ends in themselves.
Worst of all, when educationalists turn to thinking about learning itself, effec-
tiveness and performativity are, for the most part, deified rather than critiqued.
A whole “school effectiveness movement” of researchers and consultants pro-
claims that there is no limit to the speed with which the educational bus may
career down the road, never mind the potholes and the fuel gauge showing
empty. No school is so bad, the orthodoxy goes, but that a good headteacher
cannot improve it via the effective management of change (again we see effec-
tiveness and managerialism in partnership).4 An eight-page glossy publication
from The National School Improvement Network’s bulletin (NSIN/London Uni-
versity Institute of Education, 2001) talks of how, in recent years, there has
been increasing attention paid to higher order processes of understanding: to
thinking about thinking, learning to think, learning about learning, and several
other near-cognates all subsumed under the notion of metacognition. We read:
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Notwithstanding the differences between these terms, their broad
focus is of great importance for learning. Indeed, an earlier review
in this series, “Effective Learning,” highlighted such higher-order
processes as a key ingredient in the definition of effective learning.
“Effective learners have gained understanding of the processes nec-
essary to become effective learners” [sic], and effective learning “is
that which actively involves the student in metacognitive processes
of planning, monitoring and reflecting.”5
Whatever has become — talk of reflection notwithstanding — of the possibil-
ity that learning may involve time, day-dreaming, serendipitous connection of
items from extensive reading or experience; that learning often requires a slow
attunement to what is studied, involves unlearning, coming to terms with fears
and prejudices? In what sense other than the most banal might coming to un-
derstand Antony and Cleopatra (or any other moderately demanding text, not
excluding Harry Potter), or learning to appreciate Van Gogh’s pictures “involve
the student in metacognitive processes of planning, monitoring and reflecting”?
(Perhaps: “I set aside half an hour to read Act 2, then I checked on how much
I’d got through Aˆ”)
Second, education has become dominated by short-termism. The National Cur-
riculum test results in the primary school are required to rise steadily, irre-
spective of whether children’s love of books and interest in mathematics is
actually diminished in the longer term. First-year sixth-formers cram in ex-
tra AS-levels alongside Duke of Edinburgh and spending Wednesday afternoons
with Alzheimer’s patients: their eyes are on the UCAS (university entrance)
form, section 10, after the completion of which perhaps these extra-curricular
activities tail off. Undergraduate students find their modularized courses packed
with continual assessment (assignments, presentations, seminars at which they
must be present and at least minimally vocal, on-line readings their accessing
of which can be monitored6 ) with the entirely predictable result (cp. Crook,
forthcoming) that they do virtually no work or reading unless it is to be as-
sessed. There is a fragmentation of their experience of learning here, as well as
short-termism.
Third, I suggest education displays a fatal tendency to split mind from body,
and to ignore the latter. As I sketched at the beginning of this paper, education
progressively loses sight of the fact that learners have bodies. Beyond the Pri-
mary school there is a quite astonishing blindness to the importance of physical
space in education. It is as though, education’s purpose being the transmission
of knowledge, it is a matter of indifference under what conditions the trans-
mission takes place. There is even a tendency to glory in that indifference (we
are no upstart school or university, this is all part of the educational heritage
experience): the ascetic/Platonic strain has much to answer for. The conse-
quences can be seen everywhere. The secondary school often offers its pupils
virtually no space that is welcoming, safe, and identifiable as their own. How
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often is the conventional (redbrick or more recent) university designed to pro-
vide informal places where students can gather and talk, except of course the
bar? (Loud music and fruit machines: no, perhaps not the bar.) This despite
evidence of the educational value of “short and serendipitous exchanges as they
move about the university environment.”7 As for formal teaching spaces, the
newly-built satellite campus of one northern university contains hardly a single
teaching room that can be used for any purpose (seminar, tutorial, discussion)
other than lecturing from the front (there are exceptions: rooms full of com-
puters for individual use). Its central and established campus has a number
of seminar rooms, but hardly any that allow for any other arrangement than
sitting in rows facing the lecturer or tutor.
Fourth, education now permits little discussion of ends. A centrally determined
National Curriculum enshrines the common-sense assumption that schooling is
simply English, mathematics, science, geography, et cetera: until recently no
overarching justification for such a view of education was offered at all. Dis-
cussion of ends and purposes has been declared redundant: a primitive practice
which we have finally grown out of.8 This is to be expected where the triumph
of the market has made individual subjective choice sovereign and deliberation
therefore pointless. Where the consumer is supreme, educational values are
simply what the consumer happens to want. Values conceived in this way lend
themselves neither to deliberation in their formation nor to thoughtfulness in
their analysis. Between them the educational league tables, which announce
the score or position as the supreme good (your department is a 22 in Subject
Review: no more to be said), and the market assures us that philosophy is for
the dream-time.
Consider, too, the way that consideration of what university education is for
has largely disappeared. The Dearing Report of 1997 contains barely any real
reflection about the aims or point of university education. Instead there is
vacuous talk of the learning society, which in turn is conceived primarily in
instrumental and economic terms. The Dearing Report, para. 1. 10, is worth
careful reading:
The expansion of higher education in the last ten years has con-
tributed greatly to the creation of a learning society, that is, a soci-
ety in which people in all walks of life recognise the need to continue
in education and training throughout their working lives and who
see learning as enhancing the quality of life throughout all its stages.
But, looking twenty years ahead, the UK must progress further and
faster in the creation of such a society to sustain a competitive econ-
omy.9
Here higher education is justified in terms of the creation of a learning society
that, despite mention of enhancement of the quality of life, is clearly conjured
into life for the sake of the competitive economy, which it is supposed to sustain.
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And we are familiar, of course, with the way in which all debate about the aims
of higher education seems recently to have been reduced to argument about how
to fund it: means-end reasoning par excellence.
Nor are these trends peculiar to the UK. In the 1995 European White Paper,
“Teaching and Learning: Towards the Learning Society,” there is a ringing
declaration on the question of what education is for:
Everyone is convinced of the need for change, the proof being the
demise of the major ideological disputes on the objectives of educa-
tion.10
Elsewhere a section is entitled “The end of debate on educational principles.”11
The question of what higher education is for has been abolished by decree:
bureaucratic hemlock for the Socratic spirit.12
Instrumentalism, techno-rationalism, short-term thinking, managerialism, a re-
fusal to think about what, after all, education is for, a neglect of, or indifference
towards, the embodied experience of the pupil or learner; not just a failure to
nurture in him or her a love of the things of this world, but an encouragement to
disdain them: how, under these circumstances, could we ever foster the frame
of mind sympathetic to sustainable development? Can we avoid the conclu-
sion that much of the problem here is rooted in the soil of formal education?
Rousseau, whose opening words in E´mile prefix this paper, complains of a sim-
ilar tendency in his own time to force and hurry the young learner in ways that
go against his larger well-being, and he makes explicit there the connection he
sees between such perversions of education and humankind’s abuse of the nature
world. “He mutilates his dog, his horse, his slave,” Rousseau writes: so too, we
are to understand, the pupil and the student.
Rousseau’s diagnosis and prescription have of course inspired much of the strand
of educational thinking called “progressivism.” That strand in my view deserves
better than the execration to which it has been subjected in recent years, but
techno-rationalism can be countered in other and perhaps more fruitful ways.
There is no space here to do more than indicate one possible direction. My
own preference13 would be to develop the Aristotelian notion of phronesis or
practical judgement as, in Flyvbjerg’s words “an applied ethics for sustainable
development.”14 Phronetic thinking foregrounds, in Flyvbjerg’s terms, ques-
tions of power and of value; it focuses on the particular and the concrete, the
contextual and the embedded. It offers us, in the contexts of both education
and the environment, an alternative to the patterns of thinking that science and
technology have made pervasive: thinking that is harming the natural world,
and that I have argued here is continually being reinforced in the rat-runs of
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